Aphasic patients make a variety of speech errors, including perseverations, in tasks that involve a linguistic component. What do perseverative and other errors imply about the nature of the neurologically damaged and intact language systems? Here we discuss the insights into the mechanisms of aphasic perseveration afforded by connectionist models. As a base for discussion, we review the Plaut and Shallice 1 model of optic aphasic errors in object naming, which relies primarily on short-term learning mechanisms to produce perseverations. We then point out limitations of the model in addressing more recent data collected on aphasic perseveration and explain how incorporating information about the interaction of neuromodulatory systems and learning in the brain may help to overcome these limitations.
INTRODUCTION
Following stroke or brain injury, aphasic patients commonly exhibit a range of errors in spontaneous speech and in tasks requiring a verbal response. One of the most intriguing error types for language researchers is perseveration -the inappropriate repetition or continuation of a previous utterance or response when a different response is expected. 2 Aphasic perseverations often differ in character from those elicited by patients with other types of deficits, such as frontal-lobe executive dysfunction, in that they can occur after a number of correct intervening utterances or responses, leading them to be labeled recurrent as opposed to stuck-in-set or continuous. 3, 4 While recurrent perseverations in aphasia do occur after intervening responses, empirical studies have shown that they are most common after little or no delay and attenuate gradually in likelihood over subsequent trials. 5, 6 Recurrent perseverations can be on whole words, part words, or even on parts of drawings, 4, 7 and they can be influenced by several stimulus factors, including word length, 8 lexical frequency, 6, 9 relationship to the target stimulus, 4,10,11 stimulus repetition, 6 and presentation rate. 9 However, not all of these factors necessarily affect all patients in all behavioral circumstances, and which factors influence performance for any given patient may depend on the particular locus of impairment in the cognitive system, as well as on the particular tasks employed. 5, 6, 11, 12 (Also see Basso, this volume -eds)
These observations raise a couple of fundamental questions: What does the occurrence of perseverations in aphasia tell us about the nature of language processing in the brain? Are the mechanisms that underlie perseverations necessarily tied to language in some way or are they common to other cognitive domains? This paper examines what insights connectionist modeling can provide into these deeper questions.
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Connectionist models are composed of relatively simple, neuron-like processing units that engage in parallel interactions through weighted connections. Units can be organized into groups that represent different types of information to be associated, such as acoustic, phonological, or semantic within the domain of language. Connectionist models of cognitive processes have effectively addressed empirical results from a wide variety of different cognitive domains, including visual perception and attention, 13, 14 reading and language, [15] [16] [17] semantic processing, [18] [19] [20] [21] learning and memory, [22] [23] [24] working memory and cognitive control, 25, 26 and routine sequential action. 27 One of the strengths of these models has been their ability to address not only behavioral results from neurologically intact adults, but also basic behavioral impairments and patterns of errors following neurological damage and behavioral changes during the course of normal development. 15, [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] The model most relevant for the current discussion is one proposed by Plaut and Shallice 1 to account for the large number of recurrent perseverations and semantic errors made by optic aphasic patients in visual object naming. The model was trained to identify visual objects by mapping information about an object's visual appearance to its corresponding semantic information. Learning in the model included short-term correlational weights that were strengthened each time an object was processed; these weights tended to bias activity in the model towards recently identified objects, producing perseverations under damage to the model's connections. The bulk of the present paper reviews the details of this model and discusses its implications for our understanding of aphasic perseveration. Some limitations of the model in explaining patient variability and in addressing more recent experimental findings on aphasic perseveration 6, 34 are then briefly discussed. We conclude by suggesting modifications to the Gotts & Plaut, Connectionist approaches to perseveration 5 model that might address these limitations, taken from our understanding of how neuromodulatory systems in the brain interact with learning processes.
MODEL OF NAMING ERRORS IN OPTIC APHASIA
Before discussing the details of the Plaut and Shallice model, we must first consider briefly the neuropsychological pattern of optic aphasia that motivated it. Optic aphasic patients characteristically have difficulty naming objects presented visually but are able to name from other sensory modalities, such as from verbal description or touch. Unlike visual agnosic patients, they show relatively preserved comprehension from vision in that they are able to appropriately mime object use for items they are unable to name. 10, 35 It is also difficult to attribute this spared comprehension entirely to object "affordances" (actions biased by the object shape) or preserved high-level visual structural information 36 (although see 37, 38 should not be confused with notions such as "paradigmatic" or "syntagmatic" semantic relations that have been discussed by other researchers (that refer respectively to similarity versus contiguity relations among stimuli).
The Plaut and Shallice model was proposed to address this particular pattern of horizontal and vertical influences in impaired naming, a pattern that emerges in the model from its basic learning mechanisms and how these mechanisms interact with properties of visual and semantic representations. As optic aphasic patients do not appear to have language impairments other than their impaired visual naming, the model focused on the visual recognition component of the naming task. The model touches on issues of language processing mainly in its inclusion of semantic or comprehension processes.
Model Architecture
The architecture of the model that simulates the recognition of visual objects is shown in Figure   1 . forward to and backward from the cleanup units, allowing feedback or recurrent interactions. Figure 1 about here. clearly not exhaustive of all of the information people know about such objects, they were detailed enough to capture basic visual and semantic similarity relations among objects such that similar objects tended to share more of the same "on" and "off" values compared to unrelated Gotts & Plaut, Connectionist approaches to perseveration 8 objects, and were thus related by similar numerical values.
Short-term and Long-term Learning
Learning is a critical feature of this and most other connectionist models. Rather than directly stipulating the values of weights on connections between groups of units, the model learns the appropriate weights on its own that ultimately allow it to map (to connect and relate) visual input ), from all units j that are connected to it through a simple weighted sum:
where s j is the activity state of sending unit j at time t-1 that ranges continuously from 0 up to 1, γ is a parameter that determines how strongly the short-term weight contributes to the total connection weight (set here to a small value of 0.1), and c ij input pattern at each time update is then compared to the desired or "teacher" semantic pattern (discussed in the previous section), and the resulting error signals are then used to make small adjustments to all of the long-term weights in the network to reduce the error. In other words, the semantic patterns that were chosen by the researchers help to guide or constrain learning of the appropriate long-term weights in the model. Gradually, after many presentations of each training pattern, the model generates semantic unit activities to within 0.1 of the correct values at each unit for the all of the 40 objects.
In contrast to the learning of the long-term weights, the learning of the short-term weights c ij depends on the recent correlations of unit activities: There is no supervision of what is actually produced compared to some target activity pattern. In this sense, the learning in the short-term weights is automatic and unsupervised. If s i and s j are the activity states of units i and j at the end of processing stimulus n, then the learning of short-term weight c ij occurs in the following way:
where s' = 2 s -1, which realigns unit activities between -1 and +1 from 0 and 1 to allow agreeing unit activities of 1=1 or 0=0 to cause positive weight changes and disagreeing unit activities of 0 1 to cause negative weight changes (intermediate activities of 0.5 cause no change). λ is a parameter that determines how much the unit states for the current stimulus n contribute to the new short-term weight relative to the weight's existing value c ij [n] . The value of λ used in the simulations was 0.5, implying that the weight changes due to a particular stimulus would decay rapidly toward zero over 2-3 subsequent stimuli. This weight-change rule implements a simple form of correlation (s i ' s j ') that tends to reinforce the current pattern of unit activity, "biasing" the network's current processing towards prior activation states when the same units are activated again by the current stimulus. For example, if units i and j were both activated by the previous stimulus and the current stimulus reactivates one of the two units, the positive short-term weight c ij will cause positive input to be sent to the other unit (see Eq. 1 above), increasing its likelihood of being active; similarly, if unit i was active during the previous stimulus but unit j was inactive, reactivation of unit i by the current stimulus will provide negative input to unit j through weight c ij , biasing it to be inactive again. We will see in the next sections that this bias towards prior activity states by the short-term weights is the critical factor that leads to recurrent perseverations under damage to the model's connections (damage analogous to the notion of "deafferentation", i.e., Cohen & Dehaene 5 ).
Simulating Brain Damage and Error Responses
As in other connectionist models of neuropsychological impairments, 29, 31, 32 brain damage in the model was simulated by removing a fraction of the connections between groups of units after the training phase (for example, removing 30% of the connections between intermediate and semantic units). The model's recognition performance under damage was tested in two-item sequences of prime-target pairs by presenting each of the objects as prime and fully crossing the primes with each object as target (for a total of 40 X 40 = 1600 prime-target pairs). Furthermore, the presentation of each object as prime was re-done for multiple samplings of damage to the model at each set of connections (visual=>intermediate, intermediate=>semantics, semantics=>cleanup, cleanup=>semantics) and over a range of damage severities (from 5% to 70% of connections at each location). The short-term weights were set to zero prior to the presentation of each prime in the prime-target pair, they were updated at the end of the prime presentation, and they were held fixed during the presentation of the target. The model was taken to have made a recognition response to the prime or target stimulus (be it correct or an error) if the resulting semantic unit states were sufficiently close to one of the trained semantic patterns, defined by a correlation/distance measurement across the semantic units. Otherwise, the model was taken to have produced an omission. If the model made an overt response, the response was considered correct if the generated semantic pattern was closest to the correct trained pattern and it was considered an error if the generated pattern was closest to a different trained pattern than the correct one. Each error response to a target stimulus could then be classified with respect to its horizontal relationship to the target (e.g. visual, semantic, combined visual-and-semantic, or unrelated) and its vertical relationship to the prime response (e.g. identical = perseveration; semantically related to the prime but not identical = co-ordinate; unrelated to the prime). It is important to reiterate that horizontal and vertical here are in the terminology of Lhermitte and
Beauvois. 10 The terms essentially designate the temporal relationship between an error and a stimulus, with horizontal referring to an error's relationship to the correct response to the current stimulus and vertical referring to its relationship to the response to a prior stimulus (here, actually the immediately preceding prime stimulus). They are different from and should not be confused with notions of "paradigmatic" and "syntagmatic" semantic errors that have been used in some previous analyses of semantic errors.
Of the explicit error responses made by the model across all of the different damage locations and severities, over 90% shared a semantic or combined visual-and-semantic horizontal relationship to the stimulus (e.g. responding "spoon" to the stimulus fork) while less than 8%
were pure visual errors (e.g. responding "awl", a pointed tool for making holes in wood or leather, to the stimulus fork). Errors with a perseverative vertical relationship to the prime response accounted for approximately 29% of all errors, most of which also shared a semantic or visual-and-semantic relationship to the target (e.g. responding "spoon" to the target stimulus fork when the prime response was spoon). An additional 15% of the errors did not share an exact
Gotts & Plaut, Connectionist approaches to perseveration 12 perseverative vertical relationship with the prime response but were instead semantically related to the prime (e.g. responding "fork" to the target stimulus desk when the prime response was spoon). This left just over 50% of errors sharing no vertical relationship to the prime response at all, with the vast majority of these errors sharing a semantic or visual-and-semantic horizontal relationship to the target (e.g. responding "chair" to the target stimulus desk when the prime response was spoon; see Bayles et al., this volume for a similar error typology in perseveration in
Alzheimer's disease -eds).
Why Does the Model Make Semantic and Perseverative Errors?
It appears then that, similarly to optic aphasic patients, a large fraction of the errors that Figure 2 for three different stimuli: chair, spoon, and fork.
--------------------------------
Insert Figure 2 about here.
This diagram depicts a geometric interpretation of the settling process, in which any given pattern of activity over a group of units corresponds to a particular point in a high- The long-term learning mechanisms of the model are responsible for the development of these arrows and attractor basins. Through learning, the model has to form the basins in such a way that it can correctly move from any point to any other with the initial push from the feedforward pathway and the use of its semantic-cleanup interactions, despite a bias to remain in the Gotts & Plaut, Connectionist approaches to perseveration 14 previous activity state, due partially to the model's attractor dynamics and partially to the influence of the short-term correlational weights in reinforcing the last activity pattern. Correct performance requires the learning of long-term weights that are strong enough to push the model out of its previous attractor state and into the attractor basin for the new stimulus, overcoming the influence of the short-term weights which act like noise when stimuli randomly follow one or another during training. Indeed, the influence of the short-term weights can be thought of as widening or deepening the basin of attraction temporarily for recent stimuli, shown in Figure 2 by the dashed oval for spoon. For these particular visual and semantic patterns, the learning pressures are different than they would be if this model were trained to recognize visual words, as was the connectionist attractor network studied by Hinton and Shallice. 29 The reason is that visually similar objects tend to be semantically similar, too, such as spoon and fork, whereas the relationship between visual and semantic similarity is relatively arbitrary and unsystematic for visual words and their meanings. 1 This means that visual patterns representing similar visual objects do not need to be separated into very different initial semantic patterns by the feedforward pathway; they can be relayed with less transformation. Similar visual objects will tend to project to similar initial points in semantic space, as shown in Figure 2 for spoon and fork, and their respective attractor basins will tend to be close to one another compared to unrelated objects. In the event that two particular objects are visually similar but semantically very different, learning in the feed-forward pathway will tend to separate the visual activity patterns relatively early on in the pathway by developing strong weights from the visual units that are distinctive for the two objects (i.e. units that have different activity states), as this small number of units will have to override all of the shared visual featural information that is normally useful at determining the semantics of the objects.
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When connections in the feed-forward pathway are removed to simulate brain damage, errors predominantly share a semantic or visual-and-semantic horizontal relationship to the target stimulus because the attractor basins for objects that are both visually and semantically similar are close together. The effect of damage is to distort by some amount the initial pattern of semantic activity for an object, potentially allowing it to fall in a nearby attractor basin that will be cleaned up to the exact meaning of a semantically similar or a visually and semantically similar object. Thus, the model will tend to produce semantic or combined visual-and-semantic errors. It will be much less likely to produce semantically unrelated or pure visual errors because these attractor basins are much further away from the correct basin than are ones corresponding to semantic associates. When connections between semantics and cleanup units are damaged, the model produces fewer explicit errors overall and more omissions, because these are the connections that implement the attractor dynamics and allow the model to arrive at exact object meanings. The explicit errors that the model does produce under these circumstances similarly tend to be semantic or combined visual-and-semantic errors.
Damage leads the model to produce perseverations on the response to the prime stimulus for a couple of reasons. The first and main one is that the short-term correlational weights effectively lead to a wider and deeper basin of attraction for the previous attractor state. This makes it difficult to leave the previous attractor state, particularly when the current stimulus is semantically or visually-and-semantically related to the prime. If the prime stimulus was spoon and the current target is fork, the basin of attraction for fork may now overlap partially with the enlarged basin for spoon due to the short-term weights (shown in Figure 2 by the dashed oval), leading the model to return to the attractor for spoon again. As in the case of purely horizontal errors, perseverations will also tend to share a horizontal semantic relationship to the current Gotts & Plaut, Connectionist approaches to perseveration 16 target because of the proximity of attractor basins for semantic associates. Phrased more directly in terms of unit activity, when the current stimulus shares many of the same active semantic units with the previous stimulus (as in the case of semantic associates), the short-term correlational weights from these shared features start to reactivate units from the previous stimulus that should be off for the current stimulus and start to turn units off that should be on (see Eq. 2 above), leading the additional interactions between semantic and cleanup units to return the model to the previous semantic state. A second reason that the model may produce perseverations on the immediately preceding response is simply that it is less able to push out of its previous attractor state with weakened input resulting from damage to the feed-forward pathway. However, if this were the only reason that the model perseverated, it would be unable to produce truly recurrent perseverations -those occurring after intervening trials and responses. While the model was only assessed in 2-trial sequences of prime and target stimuli, the slowly decaying property of the short-term weight values (see Eq. 2) across subsequent stimuli would permit it to show perseverations following a small number of intervening stimuli, with perseverations becoming less likely with each intervening stimulus (matching empirical characteristics of recurrent perseveration 5, 6 ).
IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT MODEL
While the Plaut and Shallice model is a model of visual recognition and only touches directly on issues of language processing through its inclusion of semantic processing, it can account well for many of the documented characteristics of aphasic perseveration. Its decaying short-term correlational weights will allow it to produce recurrent perseverations following a small number of intervening stimuli with fewer perseverations across longer delays. 5, 6 It can also produce perseverations that share a horizontal relationship to the current target stimulus such as semantic, 4, 11 and its tendency to produce perseverations will be influenced by factors in training or testing such as stimulus repetition and lexical frequency. 6, 15, 34 These abilities to address characteristics of aphasic perseveration imply that similar mechanisms of learning, distributed
representations, and attractor dynamics may underlie normal language processing. In other words, recurrent perseverations in aphasia may not reflect domain-specific language processes, but instead reflect domain-general learning mechanisms that apply both in vision and language alike. This is consistent with the general connectionist approach to understanding cognition 44 that has attempted to show how a small set of domain-general computational principles can account for the richness of empirical data from a variety of different cognitive domains, including visual perception, attention, reading, language, memory, semantic memory, and working memory.
However, the Plaut and Shallice model in its current form has a couple of major limitations that might undermine these conclusions. The first is that it fails to explain why some patients perseverate more than others. All locations of damage in the model produce a similarly high proportion of perseverations -roughly 30-40% of all explicit error responses. While some patients exhibit rates of perseveration this high such as the optic aphasic patient JF 10 or the aphasic patients EB 6 and CJ 34 , most patients with language impairments perseverate much less markedly. For example, tasks like picture naming elicit average perseveration rates well under 5% of total errors across patients from different aphasic categories. 45 It is unlikely that this patient variability is explained solely by severity of impairment. The second is that it is unable to explain more recent empirical findings on aphasic perseveration, 6, 34 such as the demonstration that perseverative responses following intervening stimuli can be unrelated to their target stimuli, Gotts & Plaut, Connectionist approaches to perseveration 18 instead reflecting the earlier sequential and temporal proximity of the same stimulus and response (i.e. if the response "fork" was given the trial before or after the stimulus chair on a previous occasion, the stimulus chair might later elicit the response "fork" again). The model is not able to form associations between sequentially presented stimuli or responses because the short-term correlational weights are updated only at the end of stimulus processing, after any hint of the prior semantic state has been pushed out by the processing of the current stimulus. It should be noted that these same limitations also apply to existing priming theories of perseveration, which explain perseverations as a failure of the current stimulus to override intact facilitatory mechanisms that lead to behavioral priming effects in normal subjects. 5, 11 Indeed, the Plaut and Shallice model is really a particular form of priming theory, for which learning by the short-term and long-term weights will lead the same stimulus to be identified more rapidly and accurately following stimulus repetition. So it appears that while connectionist models have the potential to provide deep insight into the mechanisms of aphasic perseveration, they may also have something to learn from their shortcomings in accounting for the entire range of characteristics.
A remedy to both of these limitations has been outlined by Gotts and colleagues 6 in appealing to the possible neurophysiological and neurochemical bases of recurrent perseveration (see also McNamara & Albert, this volume -eds.). Several researchers have suggested previously that recurrent perseverations result from neuromodulatory deficits and low levels of acetylcholine. 46, 47 Studies of the functional role of acetylcholine in the brain suggest that it serves to modulate the dynamics of cortical processing and learning, making cells more sensitive to bottom-up sensory signals by suppressing feedback or "recurrent" signals (see 48 for a review).
Under a cholinergic deficit, perseverations will be produced because cells are less sensitive to 49 for a review of the anatomy of cholinergic pathways). It is also possible to explain temporal or sequential effects of stimulus presentation on perseverations through abnormal learning that might occur under a neuromodulatory deficit.
When feedback signals are strong at lower levels of acetylcholine, neural activity will effectively behave like the attractor dynamics exhibited by the Plaut and Shallice model. As each new stimulus is presented, it will have to drive neural activity out of the previous state and into the correct new one. If the neural representations of two stimuli are co-active simultaneously as the new stimulus drives the old one out, rapid correlational learning between the active cells throughout this transition might allow inappropriate associations to be formed between sequentially presented stimuli (as in the fork and chair example in the previous paragraph).
When one of the stimuli is presented again later, it might reactivate the representation of the other stimulus, producing a perseveration. This is not to say that sequential or temporal contiguity effects in learning are entirely abnormal. Indeed, the automatic learning of temporal contiguity is reflected in normal associative priming effects 50, 51 (e.g. identifying butter can prime knife) and is undoubtedly critical for normal language and sequence learning. Nevertheless, neuromodulatory deficits might explain the marked and intrusive presence of such effects in temporal lobes that encodes semantic knowledge). The suppressive effect of acetylcholine then might correspond to a process that shuts down or suppresses interactions between the semantic and cleanup units that implement the model's attractor dynamics. Under a deficit of acetylcholine, attractor dynamics between the semantic and cleanup units would be much stronger, occasionally dominating the visual input from the feed-forward pathway. To account for the sequential effects of stimulus presentation on perseveration, short-term weights would have to be modified not just at the end of stimulus processing, but throughout processing. This would allow the short-term weights to behave more like real activity-dependent neural plasticity mechanisms (see 53 for a recent review) and would permit units activated by the current stimulus to form associations with units that were activated by the previous one, allowing perseverations to show sequential or temporal contingencies.
Importantly, the incorporation of neural principles such as neuromodulation and how it interacts with learning would not undermine the model's basic explanation of recurrent Gotts & Plaut, Connectionist approaches to perseveration 21 perseveration. These errors would still result from mechanisms of learning, distributed representations, and attractor dynamics. Instead, it would raise new questions about the impact of neuromodulatory mechanisms in language processing. How do these mechanisms shape the learning of representations in language and other domains? As we explore further the workings of connectionist models and bring them more into alignment with our understanding of neural processes, they may provide useful revelations into these questions, too.
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Figure 1
Architecture of the Plaut and Shallice 1 connectionist model. 
